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in Rosedale. Rowell was a conservative social reformer, still hoping that the 
old rural values could be imposed upon urban Canada, but he helped to lead 
the Liberal party to an awareness that a response to the problems of the new 
age was the duty of a modern political party. 
The careers of Edward Blake and Newton Rowell were in many ways 
tragic. Both were brilliant, hard-working and successful lawyers, but much 
as they loved the law, it was not enough for them. Both drove themselves to 
exhaustion and unhappiness in politics, impelled by overdeveloped concepts 
of duty, and by ambition. They both failed to become the leaders they might 
have been; Blake because of his troubled, enigmatic personality, Rowell 
because of his inability to compromise on fundamental issues. Both were 
able politicians, but they were not politicians to the core; personal misgivings, 
higher duties and loftier principles overrode the purely political in them, and 
in the end drove them out of Canadian political life. 
The recent biographies of these two men, the first complete studies of 
either, are remarkably different in style and tone. Schull's is discursive, wordy, 
too often reportorial rather than analytical. Prang's is excessively detailed 
and complete, solidly and definitively academic in its prose. The subjects 
of the biographies too were very different; they were men of different ages, 
backgrounds and personalities. But running through the two careers ran the 
single stream of Ontario Liberal nationalism, gradually eroding all obstacles 
in its path, changing course when confronted by the immoveable, and so, by 
the end of Rowell's years, almost completely dominating Canadian political 
life. 
MARY VIPOND 
How Ontario Achieved Its Imperial Position 
Perhaps Ontario is the only province that is truly satisfied with its economic 
circumstances within Confederation. Ontario, of course, began with certain 
natural advantages: a central location, a rich agricultural resource base in 
Southern Ontario, the transportation economies deriving from the St. Law-
rence - Great Lakes waterway. But, since 1867, the province's political leaders 
have also been very adroit in exploiting these natural advantages and in en-
suring that national policies and institutions have evolved to meet the needs 
of the provincial economy. When Ontario's paramount position has appeared 
threatened, its political leaders have roused the powerful business community 
of Toronto and its allies in the communications media with the cry of a 
threat to the national interest. This has usually been enough to cow political 
leaders in other parts of the country, particularly those who wished to have 
a career in federal politics. The process by which Ontario attained its 
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imperial ascendency deserves much more attention than scholars have given 
to it. 
The architect of Ontario's dominant economic position within the national 
economy was clearly Sir Oliver Mowat, Premier of Ontario from 1872-1896. 
In 1970, a colloquium was held at Queen's University to commemorate the 
one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Mowat's birth. Several of the eleven 
papers presented to this colloquium, edited by Professor Donald Swainson 
of Queen's and published under the title, Oliver Mowat's Ontario (Toronto, 
Macmillan of Canada, 1974), give most valuable analyses of Mowat's ap-
proach to Canadian federalism. For example, in his contribution to the col-
loquium, "The Mowat Heritage in Federal-Provincial Relations", Christopher 
Armstrong points out that Mowat "defined the objectives of the province's 
external policy, of its relations with the federal government and with other 
provinces" (p. 94). Mowat's first objective "was to secure the fullest control 
over the province's economic development" (p. 95); his second to prevent 
increases in federal transfer payments to the provinces" (p. 103). Of course, 
at times, it became expedient for Ontario to support the demands of the 
poorer provinces for increased federal grants, but Mowat insisted upon com-
pensation for this support. Armstrong describes Mowat's tactics at the Inter-
provincial Conference of 1887: "In what would become a classic ploy for 
Ontario leaders, he agreed to throw his weight behind their demands, despite 
his reservations, in return for the backing of the other provinces in his 
demand for greater provincial autonomy" (p. 104). Quebec's pursuit of its 
own self-interest has been constrained by its role as the spokesman for 
Francophones in other provinces. "But Ontario's leaders have been hampered 
by no such ambivalence. They have committed themselves fully to the cause 
of provincial rights and so given expression to Ontario's particularism, or as 
some might say, its imperial ambitions. In this they have reflected the desire 
of Ontarians to fasten their version of Canadian nationalism upon the rest of 
the country, making little copies of what they see as the 'real' Canada" 
(p. 117-118). 
Mowat's heritage in federal-provincial relations can be stated briefly: what 
is good for Ontario is good for Canada. Armstrong's excellent essay des-
cribes the debt that all Ontario leaders owe to this great nineteenth-century 
politician, for Mowat seems to be the model on which all subsequent Ontario 
premiers have patterned themselves; lawyers with excellent business connec-
tions, pragmatic, not at all reluctant to use the powers of government to 
obtain economic objectives, very conscious of their position as the senior 
provincial partner in Confederation, rather patronizing of the junior partners 
or poor cousins from the Atlantic provinces and the West. Perhaps all Ontario 
premiers are required to take a course in "Mowatism" as soon as they assume 
office. Students of Canadian federalism can profit greatly by reading Oliver 
Mowat's Ontario. The papers by Margaret Evans, Carman Miller, Michael 
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Bliss and H. V. Nelles, in particular, help to explain how "Big, rich and suc-
cessful Ontario" has come to play such a dominant role in our federal system 
and the national economy. 
The essay by Professor Nelles, "Empire Ontario: The Problems of Resource 
Development", derives from his very comprehensive study The Politics of 
Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-
1941 (Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1974), one of the most important works 
on Canadian political economy to be published since World War II. In it, 
Nelles traces the evolution of provincial resource development policies in 
Ontario from the Crown Timber Act of 1849 to the early 1940s when the De-
pression finally melted away under the impact of World War II defence 
spending. The British North America Act, of course, gave the provinces juris-
diction over natural resources and the old imperial tradition worked against 
a general policy of selling off the crown lands to private interests, in sharp 
contrast to policy in the United States where "Public lands were only public 
insofar as they were waiting to become private" (p. 39). But tradition was not 
the sole source of Ontario's resource policy. Nelles points out that "mainten-
ance of the old, imperial habit of authority into the industrial age stemmed 
primarily from the interaction of interest groups and moderately conservative 
ideology, within an agriculturally barren environment" (p. 47). 
After the Civil War, as the United States entered a period .of rapid indus-
trialization and its accessible domestic resources became depleted, American 
entrepreneurs began to draw, increasingly, upon Canadian resources. The 
passing of the Dingley Tariff by the Congress of the United States in 1897 was 
a naked act of economic imperialism. Raw materials were permitted to enter 
the U.S. duty free; processed raw materials confronted a prohibitively high 
tariff. Any retaliatory export duties imposed by Canada were to be added 
to the U.S. tariff. The aim of American policy, in the terminology of modern 
development economics, was to direct the "forward linkages" from Canadian 
resources south to the U.S. economy. Although the Canadian Parliament 
passed legislation giving the federal government the authority to place export 
duties on sawlogs, pulpwood, and nickel, silver and lead ores, the federal 
Cabinet, fearing the retaliation provided for in the Dingley Tariff, failed to 
proclaim the export duties. But while Laurier was hopeful of negotiating a 
comprehensive trade agreement with the Americans, the Dingley Tariff 
posed a threat to the economic interests of Ontario that no self-respecting 
society could ignore. 
The provincial government of Ontario responded to this situation by a set 
of policies designed to ensure that the processing of raw materials took place 
within the boundaries of the province. In 1898, the Crown Timber Act was 
amended to prohibit the export of sawlogs harvested on Crown lands and the 
Waterpower Reservation Act declared that all major waterpowers were 
crown property and could only be developed by lease under detailed govern-
Acadiensis 147 
ment regulation. In 1900, an order-in-council extended the export prohibition 
to pulpwood and an amendment to the Mines Act placed a sixty dollars a 
ton tax on nickel - copper ores, to be rebated if the ores were refined in 
Ontario. The sawlog policy was almost immediately successful. Demand for 
Canadian lumber in U.S. markets was strong and sawmills moved north into 
Canada. But sawmills were much more mobile than capital-intensive pulp 
mills and nickel refineries. Moreover, since at the turn of the century, there 
was still plenty of accessible pulpwood in the Northern United States and 
Quebec, with its competitive pulp and paper industry, was not prepared to 
prohibit pulpwood exports, the Ontario legislation had little immediate effect 
on the pulp and paper industry of the province. The most interesting and 
complicated struggle took place between the government of Ontario and the 
Orford Copper Company, the predecessor of the International Nickel Com-
pany. The government of Ontario never proclaimed the prohibitively heavy 
tax on nickel-copper concentrates. The opposition of the federal government 
and the international nickel cartel together with sections of labour and 
business was too strong. 
Ontario did get its "forward linkages" from pulpwood and the rich ores 
of the Sudbury area, but not as a consequence of the "manufacturing condi-
tion" placed in the province's legislation. In 1913, with strong support from 
the powerful Newspaper Publishers' Association, the Underwood Tariff re-
moved the American duties on mechanical pulp and newsprint. Conditions 
now were ripe for the rapid development of the Canadian pulp and paper 
industry. The construction of a nickel refinery came about in a more dramatic 
manner. During World War I, when the United States was still neutral, the 
German submarine Deutschland, on two occasions, transported Canadian 
nickel from New Jersey to Germany. Canadian public opinion was aroused 
to a pitch of indignation and the expropriation of the Sudbury deposits was 
seriously discussed. "With the first word of the Deutschland outrage Inter-
national Nickel announced that it would build a new refinery at Port Col-
borne, emphasizing that construction would begin immediately" (p. 358). 
The story of Sir Adam Beck and the creation of Ontario Hydro is one of the 
most interesting in Canadian economic history. Nelles deals with the subject 
in great and absorbing detail. Beck ranks with Enrico Mattei among the 
greatest public entrepreneurs that the Western industrialized countries have 
produced. Indeed, Beck could have taught even that bizarre and dynamic 
Italian a thing or two! Beck was a political force in his own right, almost 
beyond the control of the Ontario legislature: "The public power movement 
that Beck led was a progressive business man's crusade which, in the course 
of its struggles, acquired mass support" (p. 304). Although he was opposed 
by the most powerful financial interests in Canada, they could not cope with 
the hold that he had on public opinion and the imagination of the people of 
Ontario. When the United Fanners of Ontario took office in 1919, despite 
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the fact that he had been defeated in the election, Beck was retained as 
Chairman of Ontario Hydro. He had achieved a status above party and above 
politics. In 1920, a Royal Commission, appointed to assess the feasibility of 
Beck's planned hydro-electric radial railway system, reported upon the 
"Extra-ordinary character of the Hydro Chairman. Almost single-handedly 
he had planned, initiated, built and defended a great and worthy public 
enterprise against the will of powerful interests and for that the Royal Com-
mission extended, 'full and ungrudging credit'. Yet at the same time the 
investigators could not help but deplore Sir Adam's 'absolute lack of frank-
ness', and his 'wholly unjustifiable' manipulation of public funds" (p. 420). 
The rapid growth of resource industries to meet U.S. demand confronted 
Ontario and, indeed, other provincial governments with "the complexity of 
trying to reconcile legitimate industrial demands with the essence, or even 
the form of democratic political control" (p. 394). Howard Ferguson, as 
Ontario's Minister of Lands, Forests and Mines, had a simple solution to this 
problem: he did what he considered to be in the public interest regardless of 
laws, rules or regulations. He told the Timber Commission that was investi-
gating his tenure as Minister that "I was superior to the regulations where I 
thought it was in the interests of the province . . . . no regulation should hold 
up the development of the country, that is the point" (p. 390). Sir Adam Beck 
and Howard Ferguson were confronting, at an early stage, a problem that 
remains unsolved: how to ensure democratic control of governments when 
they have a very complex interrelationship with the industrial sector, an inter-
relationship that only a few experts may fully comprehend. 
Nelles carries the chronicle of The Politics of Development in Ontario 
through to the formation of the Hepburn-Duplessis Axis in the later 1930s. 
"Because the two premiers shared problems in common, and because they 
were so much alike in personality, political outlook and manner, they were 
able to reach a meeting of the minds in a number of areas" (p. 457). Indeed 
they did, and usually in collusion with powerful business interests in the 
resource sectors. But the 1930s was a most unusual period in the history of 
the Canadian economy and Canadian politics and, fortunately, Hepburn and 
Duplessis are hardly typical provincial leaders. 
After a most comprehensive and informative survey of the government of 
Ontario's participation in resource development, Nelles concludes that "The 
habit of authority that survived from the nineteenth century did not greatly 
alter the pattern of resource development. It did, however, contribute to a 
reduction of government — despite an expansion of its activities — to a client 
of the business community. This need not have been so. The failure to bring 
the regulatory and service function of the state into the framework of demo-
cratic accountability was the failure of parties and politicians to pursue the 
logic of responsible government into the industrial age" (p. 495). This con-
clusion is simplistic and seems lacking in historical perspective. The century 
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being surveyed was the high noon of unregulated capitalism in the Western 
world. To expect the government of Ontario to escape completely from the 
Zeitgeist is hardly realistic. The province coped with its complex problems 
in the resource field as effectively as governments anywhere faced with com-
parable problems. The creation of Ontario Hydro was a very considerable 
achievement, since, in this way, one of the "commanding heights" of the 
economy remained in the hands of the state. The government of Ontario did 
co-operate closely with the private sector in the development of the resource 
industries: but, given the period, was there any feasible alternative? Certainly 
there was no body of collectivist operational concepts to draw upon to regu-
late a provincial economy. Keynesian concepts of regulating a national 
economy were not fully comprehended until after World War II and the dog-
mas of classical economics were the conventional wisdom of practically all 
politicians, civil servants and social scientists in the Western world. 
Politicians and senior civil servants are not simply cyphers who rush to do 
the bidding of the most powerful business interests. The power structure of an 
open society normally ensures a much more complex decision-making pro-
cess. As Nelles shows, Sir Adam Beck confronted the most powerful financial 
interests of the day with the power of the ballot box and he won every time. 
The decision-makers of Ontario, in the period described by Nelles, had to 
cope with the problems of the day, through the institutions of the day, with 
the knowledge of the day. An alternative view of this period, and perhaps 
a more plausible one, is that it was an early stage in the evolution of the 
modern positive state. The leaders of Ontario, during this period, realized 
that the development of the province's resources had to take place within a 
framework of government regulation. They had, however, little in the way of 
theory and practise to guide them. One thinks of Sidney Webb coming out of 
a Labour Cabinet meeting in Britain, in 1931, shaking his head and saying, 
"Socialism, socialism we just don't know how to do it." The positive state is 
still evolving. Today, most provinces have developed well-organized and 
powerful bureaucracies to treat with Ottawa and big business and to plan 
and regulate the provincial economies. Power is passing from politicians and 
from business to these bureaucracies. Nelles is rightly concerned about re-
sponsible government in a complex industrial society, but the problem now 
is one of achieving democratic control of these great federal and provincial 
bureaucracies. 
Nonetheless Nelles is correct when he argues that "The Ontario develop-
mental objective could be expressed in two words, more jobs" (p. 308). The 
major strategy to attain this objective has been to obtain as many "forward 
linkages" of all kinds for Ontario as possible through resource policies and 
also, of course, the Canadian tariff. The province has successfully achieved 
this goal. At present, it has over half the jobs in secondary manufacturing in 
Canada. Quebec has most of the rest, leaving the Atlantic provinces and the 
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West with an extremely narrow industrial base and heavily dependent on 
extractive activities and primary manufacturing. Ontario has had a develop-
ment strategy since the late nineteenth century. It has attracted able men into 
provincial politics and possessed the resources to build up a capable civil 
service decades before the Maritime provinces. The provincial government 
had the authority and the power to treat with the government of Canada and 
the big international corporations on something approaching equality. On-
tario premiers and their allies in the business community were a formidable 
combination who have ensured that federal policies conformed to the long 
term requirements of the provincial economy. 
The contrast with the Maritimes hardly needs to be stressed or stated. Over 
the period covered by Nelles, the ablest people of each generation either left 
the Maritimes or entered federal politics. Those who entered federal politics, 
typically, took little interest in the economy of the region, although federal 
tariff and transportation policies had an increasingly adverse effect on that 
economy. Since federal grants were completely inadequate for the responsi-
bilities of provincial governments, these governments lacked both the re-
sources and the will to become seriously concerned with economic problems. 
In 1934, Professor Harold Innis, reviewing federal policies, declared: "We 
have been forcibly struck with the callousness, lack of sympathy, and general 
disregard of broad policy, which has characterized federal supervision."1 
The obverse side of Ontario's successful development strategy can be seen 
in Forced Growth (Toronto, James Lorimer and Company, 1971) by Philip 
Mathias, five case studies dealing with the problems of the Atlantic Provinces, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan in their desperate search for new economic 
activities to expand and diversify a very narrow industrial base. In the ter-
minology of Gunnar Myrdal, these are the "backwash effects" that have 
derived from such a high concentration of Canadian industrial activities 
in one province. Mathias examines the Churchill Falls hydro project in Lab-
rador, the pulp mills in Saskatchewan built by the U.S. firm of Parsons and 
Whittemore, the frozen fish plant of Garden Gulf Foods at Georgetown, 
P.E.I., the forest products complex at The Pas Manitoba, and Nova Scotia's 
heavy water plant. The Labrador hydro project has been a success although 
the Newfoundland government could have been more farsighted in its power 
contract with the government of Quebec. The two pulp mills in Saskatche-
wan will probably be successful in the long run although the provincial 
government has incurred unnecessary expense and risk. "But the other three 
cases are disasters" (p. 13). Mathias, who is an assistant editor of the Financial 
Post, and Professor Abraham Rotstein in a perceptive introduction examine 
1 Complementary Report of Dr. Harold A. Innis, Report of the Royal Commission Provincial 
Economic Inquiry (Halifax, 1934), p. 225. 
Acadiensis 151 
the lessons to be drawn from these case studies. Both place great stress on 
lack of expertise of provincial development agencies and the lack of interest 
and participation by Canadian (primarily Ontario) corporations. These ex-
planations are valid but hardly definitive. 
Like so many Central Canadians, Mathias and Rotstein have an exaggerated 
idea of the effort and the resources that have been devoted to regional de-
velopment in Canada. Provincially, the governments of the Atlantic Provinces. 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan have lacked the resources and federally, the 
government has lacked the will. While Rotstein believes that "There are few 
tasks in Canada that have ranked as high on our list of priorities as regional 
development" (p. vii), the only time in Canadian economic history when 
regional development has had a recognisably high priority in Ottawa was, 
perhaps, 1969-1972. "During the decade [ 1960s] ", Mathias declares, "billions 
of dollars of capital was spent by federal and provincial governments to per-
suade anyone, from major international corporations to penniless promoters, 
to build large industrial plants in places in which they would not normally 
locate" (p. 1). But the federal program of industrial incentives for regional 
development has never been much more ambitious than it was in the last 
financial year, the fiscal year 1975-1976, when the DREE budget for industrial 
incentives for designated areas across Canada was only $92 million, almost 
exactly equal to the research budget of the federal Department of Agriculture. 
Except for a few years after 1969, regional development has never been 
taken seriously in Ottawa. Federal policies have never tackled regional 
economic development with the strategy required and on the scale required. 
Since Mowat's day, Ontario has been big and powerful enough to impose its 
concept of federalism on the whole country, a form of federalism geared, of 
course, to the interests of Ontario rather than to balanced growth across 
the country. Oliver Mowat's Ontario and The Politics of Development pro-
vide valuable insights into the process by which Ontario achieved its imperial 
position; Forced Growth provides some insights into what the consequences 
have been for the Atlantic Provinces and the West. 
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